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Abstract—Recent work has shown the importance of consid-
ering the adversary’s background knowledge when reasoning
about privacy in data publishing. However, it is very difﬁcult
for the data publisher to know exactly the adversary’s back-
ground knowledge. Existing work cannot satisfactorily model
background knowledge and reason about privacy in the presence
of such knowledge.
This paper presents a general framework for modeling the
adversary’s background knowledge using kernel estimation meth-
ods. This framework subsumes different types of knowledge
(e.g., negative association rules) that can be mined from the
data. Under this framework, we reason about privacy using
Bayesian inference techniques and propose the skyline (B,t)-
privacy model, which allows the data publisher to enforce privacy
requirements to protect the data against adversaries with differ-
ent levels of background knowledge. Through an extensive set
of experiments, we show the effects of probabilistic background
knowledge in data anonymization and the effectiveness of our
approach in both privacy protection and utility preservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of privacy models have been proposed for data
anonymization, e.g., k-anonymity [1], [2], `-diversity [3], t-
closeness [4], and so on. A key limitation of these models is
that they cannot guarantee that the sensitive attribute values
of individuals are protected when the adversary has addi-
tional knowledge (called background knowledge). Background
knowledge can come from diverse sources, such as well-
known facts, demographic information, public records, and
information about speciﬁc individuals.
As an example, consider that a hospital has the original
patient table T in Table I(a), which contains three attributes
Age, Sex, and Disease. The hospital releases a generalized
table T ∗ in Table I(b) which satisﬁes 3-diversity. Assume
that an adversary knows Bob is a 69-year-old male whose
record is in the table, the adversary can only ﬁnd out that
Bob is one of the ﬁrst three records. Without any additional
knowledge, the adversary’s estimate of the probability that Bob
has Emphysema is 1/3. However, the adversary may know
the correlations between Emphysema and the non-sensitive
attributes Age and Sex, e.g., “the prevalence of emphysema
was appreciably higher for the 65 and older age group than the
45-64 age group for each race-sex group” and “the prevalence
was higher in males than females and in whites than blacks”. 1
Because Bob is a 69-year-old male, then based on the above
1From a data fact sheet published by National Heart, Lung, and Blood
Institute (http : //www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/public/lung/other/
copd fact.pdf).
Age Sex Disease
1 69 M Emphysema
2 45 F Cancer
3 52 F Flu
4 43 F Gastritis
5 42 F Flu
6 47 F Cancer
7 50 M Flu
8 56 M Emphysema
9 52 M Gastritis
Age Sex Disease
1 [45,69] * Emphysema
2 [45,69] * Cancer
3 [45,69] * Flu
4 [42,47] F Gastritis
5 [42,47] F Flu
6 [42,47] F Cancer
7 [50,56] M Flu
8 [50,56] M Emphysema
9 [50,56] M Gastritis
(a) Original table T (b) Generalized table T∗
TABLE I
ORIGINAL TABLE AND ITS GENERALIZED TABLE
external knowledge, the adversary can infer that Bob has a
much larger probability of having Emphysema than the other
two tuples in the ﬁrst group.
In the above example, the adversary knows the correlations
between Emphysema and the attribute Age and the correla-
tions between Emphysema and the attribute Sex. We call this
correlational knowledge. In general, correlational knowledge
describes the relationships between the sensitive attribute and
the non-sensitive attributes, e.g., male does not have ovarian
cancer. Correlational knowledge is one kind of adversarial
background knowledge.
Recent research [5], [6] shows the importance of consid-
ering background knowledge in data anonymization. These
studies propose a language for expressing background knowl-
edge and analyze the disclosure risk when the adversary has
a certain amount of knowledge in the language. The analysis,
however, is unaware of the exact background knowledge
possessed by the adversary.
In this paper, we try to remedy this drawback by propos-
ing a framework for systematically modeling background
knowledge and reasoning about privacy in the presence of
background knowledge. This is a challenging task since it
is very difﬁcult to know exactly the adversary’s background
knowledge and the adversary’s background knowledge can be
arbitrary. In this paper, we reduce our scope to background
knowledge that is consistent with the data itself. We discuss
our rationale for this reduction and present a general frame-
work for modeling consistent background knowledge. This
framework subsumes different types of background knowl-
edge, including correlational knowledge.
A. Motivation
Background knowledge poses signiﬁcant challenges in
deﬁning privacy for the anonymized data [5], [6]. For example,when background knowledge is present, we cannot simply say
that no adversary knows any individual’s sensitive attribute
value after seeing the released data, because there may exist
an adversary who already knows the sensitive value of an indi-
vidual. While the adversary still knows the value after seeing
the anonymized data, we cannot say that the anonymized data
violates privacy. Intuitively, privacy should mean “no matter
what background knowledge an adversary has, the adversary
cannot learn too much new about the sensitive attribute of
any individual”. This, however, cannot be achieved when
an adversary has background knowledge that is inconsistent
with the dataset to be released. Consider an adversary who
incorrectly believes that 80% of the population has a particular
disease and has no other more speciﬁc information. In reality,
only 30% of the population has the disease and this is reﬂected
in the dataset. In this case, even when one releases only
the distribution of the sensitive attribute of the table as a
whole (without any potentially identifying information), the
adversary would have a signiﬁcant knowledge gain about
every individual. Such knowledge gain cannot be prevented
by data anonymization, and one can argue that releasing such
information is precisely the most important utility of releasing
data, namely, to correct widely-held wrong beliefs.
Thus, we have to limit ourselves to consider only back-
ground knowledge that is consistent with the data to be
released. We come to the following deﬁnition:
Given a dataset T, we say that an anonymized
version of T preserves privacy if and only if, for
any adversary that has some background knowledge
that is consistent with T, and for any individual in T,
the adversary’s knowledge gain about the sensitive
attribute of the individual is limited.
B. Contributions & Organization
In this paper, we formalize the above intuitive deﬁnition.
First, we model all background knowledge that is consistent
with the original data. We build on our previous work [7],
namely, mining background knowledge from the data to be
released. Our rationale is that if certain facts or knowledge
exist in the data (e.g., males cannot have ovarian cancer),
they should manifest themselves in the data and we should
be able to discover them using data mining techniques. The
approach [7], however, considers only negative association
rules that hold with 100% conﬁdence. It does not consider
probabilistic knowledge or knowledge such as positive associ-
ation rules, summary statistics, and knowledge from clustering.
Our novel approach in this paper is to apply kernel esti-
mation techniques [8] to model background knowledge that
is consistent with a dataset. We model the adversary’s prior
belief on each individual as a probability distribution, which
subsumes different types of knowledge that exists in the data.
The dataset can be viewed as samples from such distributions.
Our problem of inferring background knowledge from the
dataset to be released is similar to the problem of inferring an
distribution from samples, a problem well studied in statistics
and machine learning. We apply the widely used technique of
kernel regression estimation to this problem. The bandwidth
of the kernel function provides a good parameter of how much
background knowledge an adversary has, enabling us to model
adversaries with different levels of background knowledge.
Second, we propose a general formula for computing the
posterior belief based on the background knowledge and the
anonymized data. However, this computation turns out to be a
hard problem and even known estimation algorithms have too
high a complexity to be practical. To overcome the complexity
of exact inference, we generalize the approximation technique
used by Lakshmanan et al. [9] and propose an approximate
inference method. We show that the approximate inference
method is practical and accurate through experiments on some
real dataset.
Thirdly, we propose a novel privacy metric. We describe our
desiderata for quantifying information disclosure (i.e., distance
measures between two probabilistic distributions), and show
that several existing measures do not satisfy them. We then
propose a novel distance measure that can satisfy all the
properties.
Fourthly, we empirically show that the worst-case disclosure
risk changes continuously with the background knowledge
parameter B. In other words, slight changes of the B param-
eter do not cause a large change of the worst-case disclosure
risk. Therefore, while it is difﬁcult to know the adversary’s
background knowledge when releasing the data, the data
publisher only needs to use a set of well-chosen parameters
for B to protect the data against all adversaries.
Finally, through an extensive set of experiments using real
datasets, we demonstrate that our approach is efﬁcient, protects
against probabilistic background knowledge inferences, and
preserves data utility in terms of both general utility measures
and workload experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present
the general framework for modeling domain knowledge and
speciﬁc knowledge using kernel estimation techniques in Sec-
tion II. We describe how to compute posterior beliefs using
Bayesian inference techniques in Section III. In Section IV, we
deﬁne the skyline (B,t)-privacy model, describe the desiderata
for quantifying sensitive information disclosure, and present
our distance measure. Experimental results are presented in
Section V and related work is discussed in Section VI. In
Section VII, we conclude the paper and discuss avenues for
future research.
II. MODELING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we present a general framework for modeling
the adversary’s background knowledge using kernel regression
techniques [8]. This framework is able to incorporate different
types of background knowledge that exists in the data. At the
end of this section, we analyze the scope of our approach by
illustrating the types of background knowledge that can be
described in our framework.
A. Knowledge Representation
Let T = {t1,t2,...,tn} be a microdata table maintained by
the data publisher where each tuple ti(1 ≤ i ≤ n) correspondsto an individual. T contains d quasi-identiﬁer (QI) attributes
A1,A2,...,Ad and a single sensitive attribute S. Let D[Ai]
(1 ≤ i ≤ d) denote the attribute domain of Ai and D[S]
denote the attribute domain of S (let D[S] = {s1,s2,...,sm}).
For each tuple t ∈ T, let t[Ai] denote its value on attribute Ai
and t[QI] denote its value on the QI attributes, i.e., t[QI] =
(t[A1],t[A2],...,t[Ad]).
For simplicity of discussion, we consider only one sensitive
attribute in our framework. If the data contains multiple
sensitive attributes, one can either consider them separately
or consider their joint distribution. Our framework can be
extended to consider multiple sensitive attributes using any
of the above two approaches.
Representation of the Adversary’s Prior Belief. Let
D[QI] = D[A1]×D[A2]×...×D[Ad] be the set of all possible
QI values and Σ = {(p1,p2,...,pm)|
P
1≤i≤m pi = 1} be the
set of all possible probability distributions on the sensitive
attribute S. We model the adversary’s prior belief as a function
Ppri : D[QI] → Σ. Therefore, for an individual whose QI
value is q ∈ D[QI], the adversary’s prior belief of the sensitive
attribute values is modeled as a probability distribution Ppri(q)
over D[S].
An example of prior belief on a tuple t is P(HIV |t) = 0.05
and P(none|t) = 0.95. In other words, the probability that t
has HIV is 0.05 and the probability that t has some non-
sensitive disease such as ﬂu is 0.95. In our representation,
Ppri(t[QI]) = (0.05,0.95).
Representation of the Original Dataset. Each tuple t in table
T can be represented as a pair (t[QI],P(t)) where P(t) ∈ Σ,
all components of the distribution P(t) is 0 except the i-th
component where t[S] = si. Formally, P(t) = (p1(t),p2(t),
...,pm(t)) is deﬁned as follows: for all i = 1,2,...,m,
pi(t) =
￿
1 if t[S] = si
0 otherwise
Therefore, the table T can be represented as a set of n
pairs: {(t1[QI],P(t1)),(t2[QI],P(t2)),...,(tn[QI],P(tn))}.
Each pair in our representation is a tuple in the original dataset.
Thus, we can view each pair in our representation as a point
describing the sensitive value P(t) that a tuple t takes.
Finally, our goal of modeling background knowledge is to
calculate estimations of the adversary’s prior belief function
Ppri, which is deﬁned over all possible QI values in D[QI].
B. Estimating the Prior Belief Function
We build on the work of [7] and generate background
knowledge by mining the data to be released. The general
rationale is that the adversary’s background knowledge about
the data should be consistent with the data in T and should
manifest themselves in T. For example, if the adversary knows
that male cannot have ovarian cancer, this piece of knowledge
should exist in table T and we should be able to discover it
by mining the data in T. We now present a general framework
for modeling background knowledge.
The adversary’s prior belief function Ppri can be considered
as the underlying probability distribution of the sensitive
attribute in table T. And the data in the original table
{(t1[QI],P(t1)),(t2[QI],P(t2)),...,(tn[QI],P(tn))} can be
considered as a data sample that is consistent with the un-
known prior belief function Ppri. Our goal is to ﬁnd the
underlying prior belief function Ppri that ﬁts the original data.
One way of constructing an estimate of the Ppri function
is to use the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), where
the prior belief for each tuple is estimated as the distribution
among tuples with that QI value. There are several problems
with this approach: (1) the number of distinct QI values can be
very large, in which case the MLE estimator is of high variance
and does not provide a reliable estimate; (2) the MLE estimator
does not have parameters to allow estimation of different Ppri
functions; and (3) the MLE estimator models each QI value
independently and does not consider the semantic meanings
among the QI values.
This leads us to the kernel regression estimation method.
The kernel regression method is a non-parametrical technique
in statistics to estimate the conditional expectation of a random
variable. Speciﬁcally, given a dataset, the kernel regression
method tries to ﬁnd the underlying function that is best-ﬁt
match to the data at those data points. The kernel regression
estimator belongs to the smoothing method family. Kernel
methods have been extensively studied in the statistics, ma-
chine learning, and data mining communities. Existing work
has shown that kernel methods have a number of desirable
properties: (1) they can estimate the underlying function very
effectively and (2) they are simple and efﬁcient to compute.
We choose to use kernel regression method to approximate the
probability distribution function Ppri.
C. Kernel Regression Estimator
Kernel estimation includes two components: (1) the kernel
function K and (2) the bandwidth B. The kernel function
K describes the form of the weight distribution, generally
distributing most of its weight to points that are close to it. The
bandwidth B determines the size of the impact ranges of the
data point. The probability distribution at a point is estimated
as the sum of the smoothed distributions of kernel functions
associated with each point in the dataset.
Formally, for one-dimensional data (i.e., d = 1), the kernel
regression estimation is deﬁned as follows. Give q ∈ D[A1] =
D[QI], using Nadaraya-Watson kernel weighted average [10],
the probability distribution at q is estimated as:
b Ppri(q) =
P
tj∈T P(tj)K(q − tj[A1])
P
tj∈T K(q − tj[A1])
(1)
Note that the denominator is used to normalize the probability
distribution.
Thus, the probability distribution P(tj) of the sensitive
attribute for tuple tj is smoothed by the function K(.) which
peaks at tj[A1]. This allows for tailoring the estimation
problem to the local characteristics of the data.For d-dimensional data, the kernel function is chosen to be
the product of d kernel functions Ki(.)(i = 1,2,...,d). More
formally, given a QI value q = (q1,q2,...,qd) ∈ D[QI], the
approximate underlying prior belief function Ppri is estimated
as:
b Ppri(q) =
P
tj∈T P(tj)
Q
1≤i≤d Ki(qi − tj[Ai])
P
tj∈T
Q
1≤i≤d Ki(qi − tj[Ai])
(2)
where Ki is the kernel function for the i-th attribute Ai.
Again, note that the denominator is used to normalized the
distribution.
The choice of the kernel function K is not as important as
the choice of the bandwidth B. It has been shown by [11],
[12] that using different kernel functions K causes only small
effects on the accuracy of the estimator as compared with
varying the bandwidth B. So preferences are given to the
kernels with low computational complexity. We thus choose
to use the Epanechnikov kernel function, which is widely used
in kernel estimation:
Ki(x) =
￿ 3
4Bi(1 − ( x
Bi)2) if | x
Bi| < 1
0 otherwise
where B = (B1,B2,...,Bd) is the bandwidth of the kernel
function.
The bandwidth provides a good measurement of how much
background knowledge an adversary can have. Speciﬁcally,
a large Bi implies that the adversary does not have much
knowledge about the relationship between the sensitive at-
tribute S and the i-th quasi-identiﬁer Ai. On the contrary, with
a small Bi, the adversary is assumed to have more ﬁne-grained
knowledge on the distribution of the sensitive attribute with
respect to Ai. Therefore, we are able to tune the bandwidth
parameters B to model adversaries with different levels of
background knowledge.
Finally, we deﬁne the distance between two values of an
attribute. Assume the attribute domain of Ai is D[Ai] =
{vi1,...,vir} where r = |D[Ai]|. The attribute Ai is associated
with a r × r distance matrix Mi where the (j,k)-th cell djk
(1 ≤ j,k ≤ r) indicates the semantic distance between vij and
vik. The distance matrix Mi is speciﬁed by the data publisher.
One way of deﬁning the distance matrix is as follows. If Ai is
a continuous attribute, the distance matrix can be deﬁned as:
djk =
|vij − vik|
Ri
where Ri is the range of the attribute Ai, i.e., R =
maxj{vij} − minj{vij}. If Ai is a categorical attribute, the
distance matrix can be deﬁned based on the domain hierarchy
of attribute Ai:
djk =
h(vij,vik)
Hi
where h(vij,vik) is the height of the lowest common ancestor
of vij and vik, and Hi is the height of the domain hierarchy
of attribute Ai.
Given parameters B, let Adv(B) denote the parameterized
adversary whose background knowledge can be modeled by
bandwidth B. In the following, we denote Ppri(B,q) as the
prior belief of the parameterized adversary Adv(B) on the
sensitive attribute of an individual whose quasi-identiﬁer value
is q ∈ D[QI].
D. Scope of the Framework
We demonstrate the scope of the kernel estimation frame-
work (i.e., the amount of background knowledge that can
be modeled in the framework). Our framework has three
characteristics: (1) we focus on background knowledge that is
consistent with the data; (2) we model background knowledge
as a probability distribution for each tuple; and (3) we use ker-
nel regression estimator to compute background knowledge.
We now analyze the scope of our framework based on these
three characteristics.
General Privacy Models. Several existing privacy models,
such as `-diversity (which requires the sensitive attribute val-
ues in each group to be “well-represented”), do not speciﬁcally
consider the prior belief that an adversary has. This ignorant
adversary can be viewed as an adversary with a prior belief
that every sensitive attribute value is equally possible for every
individual in the table, i.e., Ppri(q) = ( 1
m, 1
m,..., 1
m) for every
q ∈ QI. This knowledge is inconsistent with the data, when
the sensitive attribute is not uniformly distributed in the data.
Given this background knowledge, the adversary’s knowledge
gain is unavoidable. Our framework does not model such an
adversary. Equation (1) and Equation (2) show that adversaries
modeled in our framework always have the correct belief about
the overall distribution of the sensitive attribute in the data.
A few existing privacy models consider the prior belief an
adversary has. The t-closeness model requires the distribution
P of each group to be analogous to the distribution Q of the
whole table with respect to the sensitive attribute. To justify
the rationale of the t-closeness model, the authors argued that
Q should be public information and the adversary’s prior
belief for every tuple in the table is modeled as Q. The t-
closeness model considers the adversary who does not have
access to any additional data other than the released data (from
which she obtains Q). The prior belief of such an adversary
is consistent with the data itself. Our framework can model
the background knowledge of this adversary as follows. For
each tuple tj ∈ T, tj distributes its probability distribution
P(tj) equally to all tuples in the table and therefore, every
tuple in the table receives the same share 1
nP(tj). This type
of adversary is a special adversary modeled by Equation (2).
In Equation (2), the Bi(1 ≤ i ≤ d) is deﬁned as the range
of the domain Di(1 ≤ i ≤ d) and the Ki(1 ≤ i ≤ d) is
deﬁned as the uniform function. In other words, Ki(x) =
1/Bi for all 0 ≤ x ≤ Bi. Then, Equation (2) reduces to
b Ppri(q) = 1
n
P
tj∈T P(tj), which is the distribution of the
sensitive attribute in the whole table.
Knowledge about Speciﬁc Individuals and Relationships
among Individuals. We note that our framework does notmodel all types of background knowledge that an adversary
may have. In [6], Chen et al. described an approach to
quantify adversarial knowledge which includes three types of
knowledge: (1) knowledge about the target individual which
are negative associations, e.g., Tom does not have Cancer; (2)
knowledge about others which are positive associations, e.g.,
Gary has ﬂu; (3) knowledge about same-value families, e.g.,
{Alice, Bob, Carol} could belong to the same-value family
(i.e., if one of them has a sensitive value, all others tend also
to have the same sensitive value).
Our framework models background knowledge as a prob-
ability distribution for each tuple and does not consider the
third type of adversarial knowledge, i.e., knowledge about the
relationship between individuals [5], [6]. In other words, we
make the tuple-independent assumption: the sensitive attribute
values of the tuples in the table are independent of each other.
The ﬁrst two types of knowledge can be represented using
prior belief functions. For example, if tuple tj does not
have the sensitive value si, then the i-th component of the
probability distribution Ppri(tj[QI]) is 0. However, our kernel
estimation approach does not directly model adversaries who
have very accurate information about a few individuals and
very little information about others. The space of such belief
functions is too large to be considered. Our approach can, how-
ever, model adversaries who have very accurate background
knowledge about all individuals, by using small bandwidths.
We use such adversaries to approximate those with very
speciﬁc knowledge about individuals.
Knowledge about Algorithms and Optimization Objec-
tives. Knowledge about the algorithms and optimization ob-
jectives for anonymizing data can be used to help adversaries
infer the original data, as shown recently by Wong et al. [13].
This kind of knowledge cannot be modeled using prior be-
lief function about individuals. It is an interesting research
direction to study this and other kinds of knowledge that may
enable an adversary to breach individuals’ privacy.
III. COMPUTING POSTERIOR BELIEF
When we have modeled the adversary’s prior belief about
the sensitive attribute of all individuals in the table, we
now explain how an adversary changes her belief when she
has access to the released table using Bayesian inference
techniques.
Before we present our approach for computing the posterior
belief, we describe how the data can be anonymized. We then
give an example showing how an adversary changes her belief
when she sees the released table and describe the general
formula for computing posterior belief. As exact inference
is hard to compute, we propose the approximation inference
method called Ω-estimate.
A. Anonymization Techniques
Two widely studied data anonymization techniques are
generalization [1], [14], [2], [15] and bucketization [16], [5],
[17]. In generalization, quasi-identiﬁer values are replaced
with values that are less-speciﬁc but semantically consistent.
Bucketization, on the other hand, ﬁrst partitions tuples into
group and then separates the sensitive attribute from the QI
attributes by randomly permuting the sensitive attribute values
in each bucket.
The main differences between the two anonymization tech-
niques lie in that bucketization does not generalize the QI
attributes. When the adversary knows who are in the table
and their QI attribute values, the two anonymization tech-
niques become equivalent. When these techniques are used
to anonymize the data, the adversary always knows that a
group of individuals have sensitive attribute values in a set,
but does not know the exact mapping. For example, in the
generalized table in Table I(b), the ﬁrst three tuples {t1,t2,t3}
form a group and take values {Emphysema,Cancer,Flu}.
But the exact mapping, e.g., which one of the three tuples has
Emphysema, is unknown. In this paper, we assume that the
adversary knows who are in the table and their QI values. In
this case, the adversary’s goal is to infer the exact mapping
between the set of individuals and the set of sensitive values.
Most existing works consider every mapping between these
two sets to be equally probable. For example, in the ﬁrst
group of Table I(b), each of the three tuples t1, t2, and t3
is assumed to have a probability of 1/3 to take Emphysema.
However, armed with background knowledge, an adversary
can make more precise inference, e.g., t1 will have a much
larger probability than 1/3 to take Emphysema. This section
provides a study on how to compute these probabilities based
on the adversary’s background knowledge.
B. An Example
Consider the example shown in Table II(a) where we have
a group of three tuples {t1,t2,t3} and their sensitive attribute
values are {none,none,HIV}. Suppose that the adversary
wants to ﬁnd out the probability that t3 takes the HIV disease.
Assume that the adversary has some prior beliefs on the
sensitive attribute of tuples in the table as shown in Table II(b).
For example, she knows that both t1 and t2 have a probability
of 5% to take HIV and a probability of 95% to have some
non-sensitive disease such as ﬂu.
From Table II(a), the adversary knows that exactly one of
the three tuples {t1,t2,t3} takes HIV. With this in mind, the
adversary lists the three possible cases of which tuple takes
HIV as shown in Table II(b). In the following, we use Prob(E)
to denote the probability the event E occurs.
In case 1, t3 takes HIV while t1 and t2 take the non-sensitive
values. Therefore, the probability that case 1 occurs is equal
to:
Prob(Case 1) ∝ p1 = P(none|t1) × P(none|t2) × P(HIV |t3)
= 0.95 × 0.95 × 0.3 = 0.271
Similarly, we obtain:
Prob(Case 2) ∝ p2 = P(none|t1) × P(HIV |t2) × P(none|t3)
= 0.95 × 0.05 × 0.7 = 0.033tuple
t1
t2
t3
disease
none
none
HIV
(a) A group of three tuples
t1 t2 t3
P(HIV |t1) = .05 P(HIV |t2) = .05 P(HIV |t3) = .3
P(none|t1) = .95 P(none|t2) = .95 P(none|t3) = .7
(b) The adversary’s prior belief table
t1 t2 t3
Case 1 none none HIV
Case 2 none HIV none
Case 3 HIV none none
(c) The three possible cases
TABLE II
AN EXAMPLE
and
Prob(Case 3) ∝ p3 = P(HIV |t1) × P(none|t2) × P(none|t3)
= 0.95 × 0.05 × 0.7 = 0.033
We are then able to compute Prob(Case 1) as:
Prob(Case 1) =
p1
p1 + p2 + p3
= 0.8
Thus, the posterior probability that t3 takes HIV is equal
to:
Prob(Case 1)×1+Prob(Case 2)×0+Prob(Case 3)×0
= Prob(Case 1) = 0.8
In summary, the adversary’s belief that t3 has HIV changes
from 0.3 to 0.8, which is a signiﬁcant increase. This shows
that inferences using probabilistic background knowledge can
breach individuals’ privacy.
C. General Formula
We derive the general formula for computing the poste-
rior belief using Bayesian inference techniques (the idea is
illustrated in the example above). We consider a group E of
k tuples (namely, E = {t1,t2,...,tk}). Let the multi-set S
denote all sensitive attribute values in E.
In the following, we use P(si|tj) and P ∗(si|tj) to denote
the prior belief and the posterior belief that tuple tj(1 ≤
j ≤ k) takes the sensitive attribute value si(1 ≤ i ≤ m),
respectively.
We denote P(S|E) as the likelihood that the tuples in
E take the sensitive attribute value in S, which can be
computed as the sum of the likelihood of every possible
assignments between E and S. For example, consider the
tuples in Table II(a), there are three possible assignments as
shown in Table II(c):
P({none,none,HIV }|{t1,t2,t3})
=P(none|t1) × P(none|t2) × P(HIV |t3)
+ P(none|t1) × P(HIV |t2) × P(none|t3)
+ P(HIV |t1) × P(none|t2) × P(none|t3)
Based on Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief P ∗(si|tj) is
proportional to the product of the prior belief P(si|tj) and
the normalized likelihood that the k−1 tuples in E\{tj} take
the k − 1 sensitive attribute values in S\{si}:
P ∗(si|tj) ∝ ni ×
P(si|tj) × P(S\{si}|E\{tj})
P(S|E)
(3)
= ni ×
P(si|tj) × P(S\{si}|E\{tj})
Pk
j0=1 P(si|tj0) × P(S\{si}|E\{tj0})
(4)
where ni is the frequency of si in the multiset S.
We can compute the likelihood P(S|E) by enumerating all
possible assignments between E and S. In general, assume
that in the multi-set S, the value si(1 ≤ i ≤ m) appears ni
times, the total number of possible assignments is k! Qm
i=1 ni!
where
Pm
i=1 ni = k.
This shows that computing the exact formula requires expo-
nential computation time. We note that the likelihood P(S|E)
is exactly the permanent of the matrix where the (i,j)-th cell
is the prior probability P(si|tj) (note that each sensitive value
in the multiset S holds a column and it will be a k × k
matrix). The problem of computing the permanent is known
to be a #P-complete problem. A number of approximation
algorithms have been proposed to compute the permanent of a
matrix. The state of the art is the polynomial-time randomized
approximation algorithm presented in [18]. However, the time
complexity is of order of O(k22). It is thus not feasible for the
general formula to work for a large k. In the following, we
turn to approximation algorithms for computing the posterior
belief. The approximation algorithm allows us to compute the
posterior belief accurately enough while in time linear to the
size of the group.
D. Approximate Inferences: Ω-estimate
In the following, we consider a heuristic to estimate the
posterior probability P ∗(si|tj). We represent the prior beliefs
as a bipartite graph where one set of nodes consists of tuples
in the group and the other set of nodes consists of sensitive
values in the group. Each edge from tuple tj to sensitive value
si is associated with the probability P(si|tj).
Our approach is a generalized version of the O-estimate
used by Lakshmanan et al. [9], where they estimate the number
of correct mappings between original items and anonymized
items. In that context, a item either can be linked to an
anonymized item or cannot be linked to the anonymized item.
In our context, a tuple can be linked to a sensitive attribute
value with a certain probability.
Based on the prior belief, tj can be linked to si with a
probability of P(si|tj) and tj0 can be linked to si with a
probability of P(si|tj0) for all 1 ≤ j0 ≤ k. Therefore, the
probability that tj takes si is given by
P(si|tj)
Pk
j0=1 P(si|tj0)
We call this heuristic the Ω-estimate (denoted as Ω(si|tj)).
si appears ni times in S and by summing up this probabilityt1 t2 t3
P(HIV |t1) = 0 P(HIV |t2) = 0 P(HIV |t3) = .3
P(none|t1) = 1 P(none|t2) = 1 P(none|t3) = .7
TABLE III
ANOTHER ADVERSARY’S PRIOR BELIEF TABLE
across all these ni values, we get an estimation of the posterior
probability:
Ω(si|tj) ∝ ni ×
P(si|tj)
Pk
j0=1 P(si|tj0)
By normalizing the probability ditribution for each tj, we
obtain
Ω(si|tj) =
ni ×
P(si|tj)
P k
j0=1 P(si|tj0)
Pm
r=1 nr ×
P(sr|tj) P k
j0=1 P(sr|tj0)
(5)
The above estimation technique makes the random world
assumption [19], where every reasonable mapping between
individuals and sensitive attribute values is equally probable.
Speciﬁcally, Equation (5) can be directly derived from the
formula shown in Equation (4) by assuming P(S −{si}|E −
{tj}) = P(S − {si}|E − {tj0}) for all 1 ≤ j0 ≤ k.
In [3], Machanavajjhala et al. studied the problem of calcu-
lating the posterior belief under the framework of generaliza-
tion by employing the random world theory. Not surprisingly,
the results they obtained for generalization are consistent with
our results for bucketization.
We note that the Ω-estimate is not exact. Consider the
example shown in Table II(a) again where we have a group of
three tuples {t1,t2,t3} and their sensitive attribute values are
{none,none,HIV}. Now, assume the adversary has different
prior beliefs as shown in Table III and she wants to ﬁnd out
the sensitive value that t3 takes. Using the general formula for
exact inference, the probability can be calculated as follows.
First, we have P({none,none}|{t1,t2}) = 1 × 1 = 1 and
P({none,HIV }|{t1,t2}) = 1×0+0×1 = 0. Therefore we
have:
P
∗(HIV |t3) =
P(HIV |t3) × 1
P(HIV |t3) × 1 + P(none|t3) × 0
= 1
It is intuitive that t3 must take the HIV disease because
none of t1 and t2 can take the HIV disease. However, based
on the Ω-estimate, the probability is calculated as:
Ω(HIV |t3) =
1 × 0.3
0.3
1 × 0.3
0.3 + 2 × 0.7
2.7
= 0.66
Here, the inexactness of the Ω-estimate results from the fact
that Ω-estimate assigns a uniform likelihood to the following
two events: (1) {t1,t2} take {none,none} and (2) {t1,t2} take
{none,HIV}. However, these two events have very different
likelihoods. In fact, the second event cannot occur under the
prior beliefs shown in Table III. In general, the Ω-estimate is
accurate enough for use in practice. In Section V, the accuracy
of the Ω-estimate is empirically evaluated with real datasets.
IV. PRIVACY MODEL WITH BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
The next step is to extend privacy deﬁnitions for data
publishing to consider background knowledge. We deﬁne our
(B,t)-privacy model and describe our deﬁnition of distance
measure between two probability distribution, which quantiﬁes
the amount of information disclosed by the released table.
A. Privacy Model
Given the background knowledge parameter B and a target
individual r whose quasi-identiﬁer value is q ∈ D[QI],
the adversary Adv(B) has a prior belief Ppri(B,q) on r’s
sensitive attribute. When she sees the released table T ∗, she
has a posterior belief Ppos(B,q,T ∗) on r’s sensitive attribute.
The distance of the two probabilistic beliefs measures the
amount of sensitive information about individual r that the
adversary Adv(B) learns from the released data. Based on this
rationale, we deﬁne the (B,t)-privacy principle as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (the (B,t)-privacy principle): Given two pa-
rameters B and t, an anonymized table T ∗ is said to have
(B,t)-privacy iff the worst-case disclosure risk for all tuples
(with QI value being q) in T is at most t:
max
q
D[Ppri(B,q),Ppos(B,q,T ∗)] ≤ t
where D[P,Q] is the distance between P and Q.
The parameter B determines the proﬁle of the adversary
(i.e., how much background knowledge she has). B =
{B1,B2,...,Bd} is a d-dimensional vector, which allows the
data publisher to specify values for different components of the
vector. For example, an adversary may know more information
about attribute Ai than about attribute Aj of the table. In
this case, we would set a smaller value for Bi than for Bj
to accurately model the knowledge of the adversary. On the
other hand, the parameter t deﬁnes the amount of sensitive
information that is allowed to be learned by this adversary.
The above privacy model only protects the data against
adversaries with a particular amount of background knowledge
B. While this model gives the data publisher the ﬂexibility to
specify the parameter B, the main challenge is how to protect
the data against all kinds of adversaries with different levels
of background knowledge. Of course, the data publisher can
enumerate all possible B parameters and enforce the above
privacy model for all these B parameters.
In Section V, we empirically show the continuity of the
worst-case disclosure risk with respect to the background
knowledge parameters, i.e., slight changes of the B parameter
do not cause a large change of the worst-case disclosure risk.
Therefore, the data publisher needs to only deﬁne the privacy
model for a set of well-chosen B parameters.
The data publisher can deﬁne a set of background knowl-
edge parameters B1,B2,...,Br and enforce the following
skyline (B,t)-privacy principle to protect the data against
adversaries with all levels of background knowledge.
Deﬁnition 2 (the skyline (B,t)-privacy principle): Given a
skyline {(B1,t1),(B2,t2),...,(Br,tr)}, an anonymized table
T ∗ satisﬁes the skyline (B,t)-privacy requirement iff for i = 1to r, the worst-case disclosure risk for all tuples (with QI value
being q) in T is at most ti:
max
q
D[Ppri(Bi,q),Ppos(Bi,q,T ∗)] ≤ ti
In practice, the data publisher speciﬁes a set of background
knowledge parameters Bi, together with the ti parameter for
each Bi. This allows the data publisher to specify and enforce
privacy requirements for different adversaries simultaneously.
As we point out above, the worst-case disclosure risk dis-
tributes continuously with respect to the background knowl-
edge parameter. This allows the data publisher to use a set
of well-chosen background knowledge parameters to protect
the data against adversaries with all levels of background
knowledge. Also, the data publisher can set default parameters
and has the ﬂexibility to deﬁne their own parameters for
special cases.
B. Distance Measure: Quantifying Information Disclosure
We study the problem of measuring the distance D[P,Q]
between two probabilistic distributions P and Q. The distance
measure quantiﬁes the information revealed to an adversary
whose prior belief is P and posterior belief is Q.
In this section, we ﬁrst identify our desiderata for the design
of the distance measure and show that existing distance mea-
sures cannot satisfy some of these properties. We then deﬁne
our distance measure that satisﬁes all of these properties.
1) Desiderata: From our perspective, a useful distance
measure should display the following properties:
1) Identity of indiscernibles: An adversary has no infor-
mation gain if her belief does not change. Mathemati-
cally, D[P,P] = 0, for any P.
2) Non-negativity: When the released data is available, the
adversary has a non-negative information gain. Mathe-
matically, D[P,Q] ≥ 0, for any P and Q.
3) Probability scaling: The belief change from probability
α to α+γ is more signiﬁcation than that from β to β+γ
when α < β and α is small. D[P,Q] should consider
reﬂect the difference.
4) Zero-probability deﬁnability: D[P,Q] should be well-
deﬁned when there are zero probabilities in P and Q.
5) Semantic awareness: When the values in P and Q
have semantic meanings, D[P,Q] should reﬂect the
semantic distance among different values. For example,
for the “Salary” attribute, the value 30K is closer to
50K than to 80K. A semantic-aware distance measure
should consider this semantics, e.g., the distance be-
tween {30K,40K} and {50K,60K} should be smaller
than the distance between {30K,40K} and {80K,90K}.
Note that we do not require D[P,Q] to be a distance metric
(the symmetry property and the triangle-inequality property).
First, D[P,Q] does not always have to be the same as D[Q,P].
Intuitively, the information gain from (0.5,0.5) to (0.9,0.1) is
larger than that from (0.9,0.1) to (0.5,0.5). Second, D[P,Q]
can be larger than D[P,R]+D[R,Q] where R is also a prob-
abilistic distribution. In fact, the well-known Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence [20] is not a distance metric since it is not
symmetric and does not satisfy the triangle inequality property.
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [20] is deﬁned as:
KL[P,Q] =
d X
i=1
pi log
pi
qi
The KL divergence measure is undeﬁned when pi > 0 but
qi = 0 for some i ∈ {1,2,...,d} and thus does not satisfy
the zero-probability deﬁnability property. To ﬁx this problem,
a variation of KL divergence called the Jensen-Shannon (JS)
divergence [21], [22] has been proposed. The JS divergence
measure is deﬁned as:
JS[P,Q] =
1
2
[D[P,avg(P,Q)] + D[Q,avg(P,Q)]] (6)
where avg(P,Q) is the average distribution (P + Q)/2 and
KL[,] is the KL divergence measure.
However, none of the above distance measures satisfy
the semantic awareness property. One distance measure that
takes value semantics into consideration is the Earth Mover’s
Distance (EMD) [23], [4]. The EMD is based on the min-
imal amount of work needed to transform one distribution
to another by moving distribution mass between each other.
Unfortunately, EMD does not have the probability scaling
property. For example, the EMD distance between the two
distributions (0.01,0.99) and (0.11,0.89) is 0.1, and the EMD
distance between the two distributions (0.4,0.6) and (0.5,0.5)
is also 0.1. However, one may argue that the belief change in
the ﬁrst pair is much more signiﬁcant than that between the
second pair. In the ﬁrst pair, the probability of taking the ﬁrst
value increases from 0.01 to 0.11, a 1000% increase. While
in the second pair, the probability increase is only 25%.
2) Distance Measure: We propose a distance measure that
can satisfy all the ﬁve properties. The idea is to apply kernel
smoothing [12] before using JS divergence. Kernel smoothing
is a standard statistical tool for ﬁltering out high-frequency
noise from signals with a lower frequency variation. Here, we
use the technique across the domain of the sensitive attribute
value to smooth out the distribution. For computing distance
between two sensitive values, we deﬁne a m × m distance
matrix for S using the same method as described in Section II-
C. The (i,j)-th cell dij of the matrix indicates the distance
between si and sj.
We use the Nadaraya-Watson kernel weighted average:
b pi =
Pm
j=1 pjK(dij)
Pm
j=1 K(dij)
where K(.) is the kernel function, which is chosen to be
the Epanechnikov kernel as described in Section II. The
bandwidth is determined based on the sensitive attribute. In
the experiments, we use “Occupation” as the sensitive attribute
with a domain hierarchy of height 2, the bandwidth is chosen
to be at least 0.5 so that kernel smoothing can be applied.
We then have a smoothed probability distribution b P =
(b p1, b p2,..., b pm) for P. The distribution b P reﬂects the semantic
distance among different sensitive values.Attribute Type # of values
1 Age Numeric 74
2 Workclass Categorical 8
3 Education Categorical 16
4 Marital Status Categorical 7
5 Race Categorical 5
6 Gender Categorical 2
7 Occupation Sensitive 14
TABLE IV
DESCRIPTION OF THE Adult DATASET USED IN THE EXPERIMENT
k ` t b
para1 3 3 0.25 0.3
para2 4 4 0.2 0.3
para3 5 5 0.15 0.3
para4 6 6 0.1 0.3
TABLE V
PRIVACY PARAMETERS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
To incorport semantics into the distance between P and Q,
we compute the distance between b P and b Q as an estimate
instead: D[P,Q] ≈ D[b P, b Q]. The distance D[b P, b Q] can
be computed using JS-divergence measure (in Equation (6))
which is well-deﬁned even when there are zero probabilities
in the two distributions. We can see that our distance measure
has all of the ﬁve properties described in Section IV-B.1.
V. EXPERIMENTS
The main goals of the experiments are: (1) to demonstrate
the effects of probabilistic background knowledge on data
anonymization, (2) to evaluate the accuracy of the Ω-estimate,
(3) to illustrate the continuity of the worst-case disclosure risk
with respect to the background knowledge parameter B, (4)
to show the efﬁciency of computing (B,t)-private tables , and
(5) to show the effectiveness of the (B,t)-privacy model in
utility preservation.
The dataset used in the experiments is the adult dataset
from the UC Irvine machine learning repository, which is
comprised of data collected from the US census. We use seven
attributes of the dataset, as shown in Table IV, where the
sensitive attribute is Occupation. Tuples with missing values
are eliminated and there are about 30K valid tuples in total.
All algorithms are implemented in Java and the experiments
are performed on a 3.4GHZ Pentium 4 machine with 2.0GB
of RAM.
Given the dataset, we use the variations of Mondrian multi-
dimensional algorithm [24] to compute the anonymized tables
using different privacy requirements: (1) distinct `-diversity;
(2) probabilistic `-diversity; (3) t-closeness; and (4) (B,t)-
privacy.
The variations of Mondrian use the original dimension
selection and median split heuristics, and check if the speciﬁc
privacy requirement is satisﬁed. Note that we can generate the
`-diverse table using the anatomizing algorithm [16]. However,
Anatomy does not generalize the quasi-identiﬁers and it would
be unfair to compare Mondrian with Anatomy.
The four privacy models protect the data against attribute
disclosure. To protect identity disclosure, we also enforce k-
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anonymity (each group contains at least k records) together
with each of the above privacy models.
For each experiment, we evaluate the performance with
respect to four sets of privacy parameters in Table V. To
make the comparisons easier, we use the same ` value for
distinct `-diversity and probabilistic `-diversity, the same t for
t-closeness and (B,t), the same b value, and k = ` for all
cases as shown in Figure V.
A. Effects of Probabilistic Background Knowledge
We assume that adversary’s background knowledge is mod-
eled by the b0 parameter, i.e., B0 = (b0,b0,...,b0). To illustrate
the effects of probabilistic background knowledge, we apply
the prior belief function computed from B0 on each of the four
anonymizedtables, compute the posterior beliefs of each tuple,
and report the number of tuples whose privacy is breached
under that privacy requirement. These tuples are viewed as
vulnerable to the probabilistic background knowledge attacks.
Our ﬁrst set of experiments investigates the effect of b0
parameter on the number of vulnerable tuples. Figure 1(a)
shows the number of vulnerable tuples in the four anonymized
tables with respect to different b0 values. The number of
vulnerable tuples decreases as b0 increases because a larger
b0 value corresponds to a less-knowledgeable adversary.
The second set of experiment investigates the effect of
privacy parameters shown in Table V on the number of
vulnerable tuples. We ﬁx the adversary’s parameter b0 = 0.3.
Figure 1(b) shows the experimental result.
As we can see from these ﬁgures, the (B,t)-private table
contains much fewer vulnerable tuples in all cases. This shows
that the (B,t)-privacy model better protects the data against
probabilistic-background-knowledge attacks. 0
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B. Accuracy of the Ω-estimate
To evaluate the accuracy of the Ω-estimate, we randomly
pick a group of N tuples from the table and apply both exact
inference and the Ω-estimate on the N tuples. Each tuple has a
prior distribution Ppri, the exact inference distribution Pexa,
and the Ω-estimate distribution Pome. We then compute the
average distance error, which is the estimation error averaged
over all of the N tuples:
ρ =
1
N
N X
j=1
|D[Pexa,Ppri] − D[Pome,Ppri]|
We run the experiment 100 times and the average is
reported. Figure 2 depicts the average distance error with
respect to different N values. In all cases, the Ω-estimate is
within 0.1-distance with the exact inference. The experiments
show that the Ω-estimate is accurate enough to be used in
practice.
C. Continuity of Disclosure Risk
The goal of this experiment is to show the continuity of
the worst-case disclosure risk with regard to the background
knowledge parameter B. We ﬁrst ﬁx the adversary with the
background knowledge parameter b0 which can be one of
the four values {0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}. We then generate a set
of (B,t)-private tables with different b parameters. For each
anonymized table, we compute the worst-case disclosure risk
by the adversary. The worst-case disclosure risk is computed
as the maximum knowledge gain for all tuples in the table:
maxq{D[Ppri(B0,q),Ppos(B0,q,T ∗)]}. Figure 3(a) shows the
results. As we can see from the ﬁgure, the worst-case disclo-
sure risk increases/decreases continuously with respect to the
b parameter.
We then evaluate the continuity of the disclosure risk
with respect to the background knowledge parameters B =
(b1,b1,b1,b2,b2,b2), i.e., the adversary’s background knowl-
edge on the ﬁrst three attributes is modeled by b1 and her
background knowledge on the last three attributes is modeled
by b2. Here, we ﬁx the adversary’s parameter b0 = 0.3 and
compute the worst-case disclosure risk by the adversary with
respect to different (b1,b2) values. Figure 3(b) shows the
results. As we can see the ﬁgures, the worst-case disclosure
risks increases/decreases continuously among the domain of
(b1,b2).
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These experiments show that slight changes of the back-
ground knowledge parameters will not cause a large change
of the worst-case disclosure risk, the conjecture we made in
Section IV. This validates our approach of using a set of well-
chosen background knowledge parameters to protect the data
against adversaries with all levels of background knowledge.
D. Efﬁciency
We compare the efﬁciency of computing the four
anonymized tables. We compare the efﬁciency with regard to
different privacy parameters. Figure 4(a) shows the results. As
we can see from Figure 4(a), the running time decreases with
increasingly stringent privacy requirements because Mondrian
is a top-down algorithm.
Here, the time to compute the (B,t)-private table does
not include the time to run the kernel estimation method to
compute the background knowledge. As we can see from
Figure 4(a), without considering the time for estimating back-
ground knowledge, the running time to compute the (B,t)-
private table is roughly the same as the time to compute the
other tables, usually within seconds.
We then evaluate the efﬁciency of computing background
knowledge using the kernel estimation method, which is the
main efﬁciency issue of the (B,t)-privacy model. Figure 4(b)
shows the results. As we can see from the ﬁgures, the time
to compute background knowledge is larger than the time to
anonymize the data, partially because Mondrian runs much
faster than many other anonymization algorithms. Moreover,
computing background knowledge is still fast enough for
large-enough datasets, usually within several minutes.
E. Data Utility
To compare data utility of the four anonymized tables, we
evaluate the anonymized data both in terms of general utility
measures and accuracy in aggregate query answering.
1) General Utility Measures: We ﬁrst compare data utility
based on two general utility measures: Discernibility Metric
(DM) [25] and Global Certainty Penalty (GCP) [26].
Figure 5(a) shows the DM cost while Figure 5(b) shows the
GCP cost for the four anonymized tables. In both experiments,
we evaluate the utility measure as a function of the privacy
parameters shown in Table V. In both ﬁgures, the (B,t)-
private table shows comparable utility with the other four
anonymized tables. 0
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2) Workload Experiments: We evaluate data utility in terms
of performance in aggregate query answering [27], [16], [28].
Figure 6(a) shows the average relative error as a function
of the query dimension. As the query dimension increases,
average relative error decreases and therefore, the anonymized
data performs better for queries with a larger query dimension.
Figure 6(b) shows that as the query selectivity increases,
average relative error also decreases. This shows that the
anonymized data can answer more accurately on queries with
a larger selectivity.
In all ﬁgures, we can see that the (B,t)-private table can
answer queries as accurately as all other anonymized tables.
VI. RELATED WORK
We ﬁrst review existing work in data anonymization and
explain how our technique differs from them. We classify
these works into three categories: (1) general privacy models,
(2) background knowledge integration, and (3) anonymization
techniques. We then examine several research works that have
studied background knowledge in other contexts.
General Privacy Models. The k-anonymity model [1], [2],
[15] assumes that the adversary has access to some publicly-
available databases (e.g., a vote registration list) and the
adversary knows who is and who is not in the table. A few
subsequent works [3], [29], [30] recognize that the adversary
also has knowledge of the distribution of the sensitive attribute
in each group. The t-closeness model [4] further observed that
the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the overall table
should also be public information.
Recently, the σ-presence measure [31] observed that know-
ing an individual is in the database poses privacy risks. The
m-conﬁdentiality model [13] recognized that knowledge of the
mechanism or algorithm of anonymization for data publishing
can leak extra sensitive information.
None of these general privacy models consider the kinds
of background knowledge we consider in this paper. As we
show in the experiments in Section V-A, general privacy
models (e.g., `-diversity and t-closeness) are vulnerable to
probabilistic background knowledge attacks.
Background Knowledge Integration. In [5], Martin et al.
presented the ﬁrst formal analysis of the effects of background
knowledge. They proposed a formal language to express
background knowledge about the data and quantiﬁed back-
ground knowledge as the number of implications in their
language. They deﬁned the (c,k)-safety model to protect the
data in the worst-case when the adversary has knowledge of
k implications.
Chen et al. [6] extended the framework of [5] and proposed
a multidimensional approach to quantifying an adversary’s
background knowledge. They broke down the adversary’s
background knowledge into three components which are more
intuitive and deﬁned a privacy skyline to protect the data
against adversaries with these three types of background
knowledge.
While these work provided a framework for deﬁning and
analyzing background knowledge, they do not provide an
approach to allow the data publisher to specify the exact
background knowledge that an adversary may have. In [7], we
proposed to mine negative association rules from the data as
knowledge of the adversary. However, as we have pointed out,
this approach is limited in modeling background knowledge.
Recently, Du et al. [32] proposed an approach to integrate
background knowledge in privacy quantiﬁcation. They don’t
provide an approach for modeling background knowledge, but
compute the unknown conditional probabilities based on the
maximum entropy principle. On the other hand, we explicitly
propose an approach for modeling background knowledge and
present a framework for protecting privacy in the presence of
such background knowledge.
Anonymization Techniques. Most anonymization solutions
adopt generalization [1], [14], [15], [33], [25], [34], [35], [36],
[24] and bucketization [16], [17], [5], [37]. Other anonymiza-
tion techniques include clustering [38], space mapping [39],
spatial indexing [40], data perturbation [41], [42], [43]. On the
theoretical side, optimal k-anonymity has been proved to be
NP-hard for k ≥ 3 in [44], [45], and approximation algorithms
for ﬁnding the anonymization that suppresses the fewest cells
have been proposed in [44], [45], [46].
Background Knowledge in Other Contexts. The above
works focus on data anonymization in the context of privacy-
preserving data publishing. A number of research works have
examined background knowledge in other contexts. Yang and
Li [47] studied the problem of information disclosure in XML
publishing when the adversary has knowledge of functional
dependencies about the XML data. In [9], Lakshmanan et al.
studied the problem of protecting the true identities of data
objects in the context of frequent set mining when an adversary
has partial information of the items in the domain.VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a general framework for modeling
and computing background knowledge using kernel methods.
We provide efﬁcient techniques to estimate posterior distribu-
tion based on the anonymized table and the prior distribution.
We present a design of the (B,t)-privacy model, which
protects privacy in the presence of adversarial background
knowledge. Finally, we show that probabilistic background
knowledge is a real concern and we demonstrate the effective-
ness of our approach through experiments on a real dataset.
Here are several future research directions on this topic.
Relational background knowledge. Our knowledge represen-
tation assumes the tuple-independent property and does not
model the relationship among individuals. One example of
such kinds of knowledge may be “either Alice or Bob has ﬂu
but not both”. One approach is to use graphs, where nodes
represent individuals and edges represent relationships. How
to discover such knowledge and how the data publisher can
make use of such knowledge in the data anonymizationprocess
are interesting problems for future research.
Dealing with other background knowledge. This paper con-
siders background knowledge that can be mined from the data
to be released. In practice, the adversary may have access to
additional background knowledge. Wong et al. [13] initiated a
study on how to protect the data against an adversary who has
knowledge of the mechanism or algorithm of anonymization.It
is interesting to examine other kinds of adversarial knowledge.
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